Why Saudi-Israeli relations are likely to happen
Are Israel and Saudi Arabia edging closer to normalization — despite the regional conflict and regardless of the US presidential outcome this week?
Signs are mounting that this landmark agreement could come together even within the year.
Before the Oct. 7 Hamas attack on Israel, Saudi Arabia and Israel were in deep discussion about peace and expanding the Abraham Accords.
These hopes appeared dashed after a year of war, with over 40,000 Palestinians reportedly dead, according to Gaza’s Hamas-run Health Ministry, and Saudi Arabia’s hardline stance on the need for a Palestinian state.
Yet, the Abraham Accords remain intact — a sign these dreams may not be shattered.
Trade has been a major advantage of the Accords — which normalized relations between Israel and three Arab countries: United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain and Morocco — and it remains resilient.
In 2023, UAE-Israel trade reached $2.9 billion. By mid-2024 it was already at $1.922 billion, potentially reaching $3.3 billion by year-end, according to Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics.
Morocco and Bahrain have also seen noticeable trade growth this year.
Tourism to Abraham Accords countries declined, mainly as a result of Israeli travel advisories.
However, there has been a quiet yet notable rise in Arab delegations visiting Israel since the war, says Dan Feferman, executive director of Sharaka, an NGO promoting people-to-people peace between Israel and Accords countries.
For example, in July, a delegation of 28 Moroccan social-media influencers came to Israel.
They toured the southern communities destroyed by Hamas, visited the Yad Vashem Holocaust museum and met with Israeli politicians in conversations on counter-extremism.
Even if they disagree with Israel’s response to Oct. 7, Arab groups acknowledged the impact of the attack, Feferman says.
The UAE and Bahrain only signed the Abraham Accords in 2020 with clear support from the Saudis, who could have withdrawn it after Oct. 7.
Instead, Riyadh appears to have become even more tolerant toward Israel.
A spring report from IMPACT-se in London revealed that Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s Education Ministries made notable updates to its curriculum, removing anti-Israel content from textbooks.
Of course, in tandem with finance, the driving force behind the Abraham Accords has always been the Gulf states’ recognition of the distinct threat posed by Iran and its proxies.
The Accords were the first step toward a potential regional defense pact, ideally backed by America in case of an Iranian attack.
For the Gulf states, Israel was seen as crucial to such a pact, with its military capabilities as a key asset for regional security. However, the Oct. 7 infiltration of Israel by Hamas — leading to more than 1,200 people killed and more than 250 kidnapped — put Israel’s strength and, by extension, the foundation of the Accords into question.
If Israel was caught off guard by Hamas, could it really deter Iran? Recently, however, this perception has begun to shift.
Since July, Israel has conducted targeted assassinations of Hamas leaders Ismail Haniyeh and Yahya Sinwar, and Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah.
The country has severely weakened Hamas’s military infrastructure. Israel’s retaliatory strikes against Iran on Saturday morning reinforced its strength.
Instead of targeting Iran’s nuclear reactors or energy sector — which the Saudis feared could provoke a retaliatory response on their territory — Israel carried out precise attacks on missile manufacturing facilities, missile systems and aerial tools used by Iran in recent attacks on Israel.
While Saudi Arabia and the UAE both condemned the impact of the strikes on regional stability, neither mentioned Israel by name or specifically rebuked Israel — a tacit sign of approval.
This reveals two worlds: the visible and the hidden, with backchannel communications likely at play.
Last month, Prime Minister Netanyahu addressed the UN General Assembly, framing a clear choice for the Middle East: either be cursed by Iran’s aggression or blessed by normalization with Saudi Arabia.
“Which of these two maps that I showed you will shape our future?” he asked. “Will it be the blessings of peace and prosperity for Israel, our Arab partners, and the rest of the world? Or will it be the curse in which Iran and its proxies spread carnage and chaos everywhere?”
When it comes to the requirement for a Palestinian state, reading between the lines is also essential.
The Saudis should recognize that Israel cannot simply agree to a Palestinian state overnight, given the 101 hostages still in Gaza as well as the well-known corruption and lack of viable leadership within the Palestinian Authority.
However, even the start of a process might be enough to set normalization in motion. Just last month, Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman reportedly told US Secretary of State Antony Blinken that he doesn’t prioritize the Palestinian issue — it’s more a matter of optics for his people.
A second term for former President Donald Trump would likely make orchestrating a Saudi peace deal easier, given his role in orchestrating the Abraham Accords in 2020.
However, Vice President Kamala Harris could also make a deal happen — unless Biden does it first, before Jan. 20.
If history has taught us anything, it’s that the Middle East can change in an instant.
But if Oct. 7 was meant to derail the momentum between Israel and Saudi Arabia, Hamas may have failed — yet again..
Maayan Hoffman is Executive Editor and Strategist for ILTV News and a correspondent for The Media Line.